This dissertation, based on the newly declassified Nixon presidential documents, offers an in-depth case study of 1969-1972 Sino-US summit meetings, whereby to interpret the functions of discourse in shaping the negotiation of two ever antagonizing states toward rapprochement.The study examines the entire evolving process of 1969-1972 Sino-US summitry. It, in particular, looks at its four stages: (1) both sides seeking and building communicating channels, initiating dialogue and exchanging information, the channels explored including Warsaw talk, Pakistan, Paris and New York; (2) both sides preparing negotiations leading to Kissinger's secret trip to China, Polo II Action and Haig's China trip; (3) holding summit between Nixon and Mao Zedong, and series of talks between Nixon and Zhou Enlai; (4) "packaging" the symbol of successful summitry—-negotiations on drafting Sino-US Joint Communique --through the Kissinger-Zhou Enlai and Kissinger-Qiao Guanhua talks.In a sense, the negotiation is a discursive confrontation, in which the discourse serves as the reflection of conception. It seems that when the American and Chinese leaders met in 1971-1972, their minds were already set for Sino-US rapprochements. How much was such a mind-set